Author: George Robartes

Orders of the day, Volume 31, Issue 6, Dec/Nov 1999

Part I dealt with the Clothing, Equipping and Arming of a dragoon. This part deals with the Organisation, Drill and Tactics. The subtitle ‘Dragoons are not just Musketeers on Horseback’ is mainly because a number of well-respected officers (Gustavus Adolphus, Rupert, Cromwell, Luke) during the period knew the difference. My favourite confirming piece of evidence for this is from Samuel Luke, who was Scoutmaster General of the Army of Parliament before becoming Governor of Newport Pagnell. On 28th October 1644 he wrote two letters; the first to Colonel Massey which included the statement, ‘had sent 6000 horse and 1000 Dragoons under Sir William Balfour’. The second, written to the Bedfordshire Committee, states: ‘I sent 2 troops of horse and 40 musketeers mounted on country horses, to lie as near to them as may be’. It could be accepted that up until now, for some reason, dragoons were dragoons and musketeers on horseback were simply that! I now hope to explain why this was so.

It has been suggested that dragoons operated as ‘ad hoc’ units of marauders without any regimental structuring, and this could be supposed by their activities in the field. But this was certainly not the case. The command structure of a dragoon unit was unique to their requirements, whereas other ‘types’ shared commonality. Curassiers and harquebusiers (heavy and light cavalry) had identical structuring, as did musketeers and pikemen, although their roles on the field were somewhat different.

Each of the Armies of Parliament and their Royalist counterparts had dragoon ‘regiments’ attached to them from the start; in some cases up to 500 men or more in a regiment. Perhaps the most famous of these was the Eastern Association’s under Manchester which, combined with the remnants of Waller’s Southern Association - the majority of which (supplied by the London Brigade, City and Suburban Dragoons), became the New Model Army’s regiment under Okey. Dragoons were also favoured by garrison commanders for their all-round ability during scouting and patrol duties.

It is generally accepted that this unique regimental structure is that which is appendixed to Barriffe’s Some Brief Instructions for the Exercising of the Horse Troopes. In this document, produced after the Restoration, Barriffe lists the various arms of service with reference to pay. The whole document, although published in 1661, refers to Parliament’s Army during the late Civil Wars, and acknowledges John Cruso’s earlier work and is certainly confirmed by works as early as 1622.

The structure is peculiar because it allows for the inclusion of two sergeants and two drums (drummers). Why sergeants? Sergeants then as now were responsible for the intensification of training and weapons drill and for general ‘encouragement’ in combat. Given that two sergeants were allocated to a regiment generally much smaller than that of musketeers (which were allowed three), one can deduce that dragoons received much more attention in this area and greater control of their individualistic nature. This was reflected in their pay, as even dismissing the ‘horse money’ normally included in their wages when operating as ‘firelocks’ and guards, they received in the order of 30-50% higher wages. Pay then, as today, reflected ability. It was generally recognised that the lowliest person could operate ‘jackanapes’ fashion in a musket or pike block without the need to think, whereas much more was expected from the lowliest dragoon. Every attempt was made to recruit from the ‘middling sort’ those with skills, both mental and manual, rather than from labourers.

Why drums? The duties of drummers have been dealt with in “Orders” Vol. 30 No 6 and much of this would have applied to the drummers allotted to the regiment of dragoons. But here we are faced with a problem. A regiment of foot would have had between 11 and 21 drummers; a regiment of dragoons, even though much smaller, only 2. Although receiving the same direct pay as a foot drummer, the dragoon drummer also received ‘horse money’ at the same rate as his pay and that of his superior officers. This was to maintain his ‘nimble stoned horse, or good lustie guelding’ for rapid escape in the event of failure whilst beating a ‘parlez’ at the walls of some besieged garrison - a complete contradiction to the statement that ‘his service is no other than on foot’. Manoeuvring to the beat of the drum was not needed in a regiment of dragoons, and all actions in which they were involved confirms this, from Edgehill to Naseby.

Barriffe’s structure (left) is of the field regiment. However in garrisons such as Newport Pagnell and Gloucester, where dragoons were also favoured because of their abilities, the troop captain would receive his commands directly from the governor or commandant.

Unfortunately there is no known instruction manual dedicated to the drilling and conducting of a regiment of dragoons, but many clues are contained within those that do exists. It is regrettable that Nathan Burt did not extend or elaborate his Militarie Instructions, but there is much material in bundles in the P.R.O. and one day someone may come up trumps! Militarie Instructions, although a tactical manual for dragoons, gives a number of clues as to what is actually happening with regard to others (particularly Barriffe and Cruso) and their statements regarding actual field conduct and organisation, and quietly but respectfully rebuffs them. Here regimental elitism rears its head, with those officers of the cavalry ‘knocking’ dragoons.

Every so-called drill manual at this time was printed and paid for by private individuals, each having a slightly different theory as to how it should be done. (It is said that Fairfax possessed a copy of Barriffe. But as this ‘manual’ is clearly written for the benefit of the Artillery Gardens with its ridiculous manoeuvres, and even includes a speech to the spectators, I suggest Fairfax used it to stop his table rocking on uneven floors!)

In reading and hopefully digesting the contents of a number of manuals, one begins to establish a clear picture of ‘posturing’ and exercising dragoons, and this picture is solidified by a later manual known under several names, but chiefly as the English Military Discipline. Why this is so interesting is that the publishers, Thomas Newcombe and Henry Hills, served as dragoons during the late wars and that there is no author recognised. This manual, although certainly based on earlier works and of course the Civil Wars, contains a section on the ‘Exercise of Dragoons’. It is clear and simple in the manner of Richard Elton’s Compleat Body (‘as usually it is practised in our Army’) and describes the postures for the musket, both matchlock and firelock. The foot then, as previously, was armed with matchlock and bandolier, and the dragoon with firelock and cartridge. As Barriffe earlier confirms in the description of the cavalry postures, ‘As concerning the use of Cartouches, in those late Civil Wars of England, the use of them (by the Cavalry) hath been little’. And as we have already seen,1000 cartridge boxes had been issued to dragoons along with other dragoon kit in April 1645, and prior to that in 1643 and 1644.

These facts, coupled with another that dragoons were never issued rests, suggests that those postures printed in this later manual, with all its familiarity of cartridge use by dragoons only, strongly indicate that our period dragoons used a ‘rest-less’ drill (no left arm waving as though you have an imaginary rest), forward musket poise and a method of loading and firing much faster than musketeers. Indeed, later colonial manuals required, with the same equipment, that musketeers be drilled to fire a round every 13 seconds (almost 5 per minute), whereas the lesser-equipped musketeer could possibly manage 3! This level of drilling can be confirmed by actions from both sides. At Marston Moor, Col. Frizell’s (Fraser’s) Dragoons ‘outshot’ a well-defended number of Royalist musketeers ‘by good management’ and later ‘by their shot’ (rapidity of volley fire) soon opened up Newcastle’s Whitecoats for the horse to enter and put them to the sword. At Winceby in October 1643 Cromwell’s cavalry charge was met with a second volley from Royalist dragoons ‘within half a pistol shot’ of firing the first, implying a more rapid reloading technique or better drill than that of musketeers.

Having shown that dragoons were better-equipped, better-trained and drilled (and rewarded accordingly), were probably more intelligent and therefore had greater skill on horseback (something that a person from the labouring classes would have lacked), the suggestion that they were ‘just musketeers on horseback’ is clearly nonsense.

When discussing Tactics, Duties and ‘Dragoon Action’ we must refer to what actually took place, rather than what is written in a number of rather biased manuals. When taking an overall picture of the English Civil Wars, what do we see? A few battles, numerous sieges and innumerable skirmishes and minor actions. It is in this role dragoons did the better service. A number of eye-witness accounts indicate what dragoons actually did and didn’t do.

It seems clear, certainly as far as the Army of Parliament was concerned, that they did not constitute a Forlorn Hope. These groups consisted of commanded musketeers from the ranks (probably volunteering for extra pay), sent ahead of the main battalia a couple of hundred yards or so, to ‘bring on’ the opposing Army, or attempt to break up the solidity of the oncoming foot by musket fire. This had been used under Maurice et al in the Dutch ‘school’ on the Continent, and by Gustavus Adolphus in the Swedish. This job was much more ‘cheaply’ done by the foot, as it required no particular skill. Nor did they combine with the main musket blocks on arrival at battle and join in with the general mass volley fire until ammunition was spent and it was time to rush at the enemy with butt of musket. A terrible waste of resources - that was the job of the musketeer.

That seems to be that as far as what they didn’t do is concerned. So what did they do?

Dragoons were mainly employed as cavalry support - a sort of rapid deployment force that was not tired by miles of trudging along muddy tracks on foot, which could move freely about the field and provide rapid accurate fire to influence a dispute. They could at the last minute before battle be sent to reinforce a visible weakness and provide ranging fire to disrupt cavalry charges. At Naseby part of Okey’s had remained close to the headquarters at Shuckburgh Hall (at the confluence of three main tracks). This gave the Army of Parliament the ability to deploy them rapidly on either flank or centre where required, immediately prior to battle. Cromwell, having seen Ireton’s poor position on the left wing with reduced numbers, ordered Okey to line the hedges at Lantyford Furlong to provide disruptive fire on Rupert’s charge, approximately 400 yards or so ahead of Ireton’s front line. Lining hedges - every 10th man holding the horses by linking the reins - typical dragoon stuff. But what is not known is that at Naseby 1,100 of Essex’s Horse and 600 dragoons (the Associated Horse in Streeter’s map) were squeezed in with Rossiter on the right wing behaving as - you guessed it - cavalry! It was probably these dragoons that kept the Royalist right wing off the field, enabling the Horse to turn on the Royalist foot.

The remainder of Okey’s men, operating as firelocks (having probably sacrificed their fresh mounts to the 600 Essex dragoons that arrived late), along with a company or two of Fairfax’s tawny-coated firelocks, guarded the Baggage Train to the south-west of Naseby. Here again the training and discipline of the dragoons/firelocks paid off by holding and turning the much superior force of Rupert’s cavalry who attempted to take the Baggage. It has been suggested that a completely new regiment had been raised and trained for Okey, but this is not so. To raise, equip and train a regiment between April and June 1645 (6 - 7 weeks) would be impossible. The experience of the Eastern Association Dragoons was already in place and well practised, and Naseby cannot be used as an exception. As Barriffe put it when comparing dragoons to the rest of the Horse, ‘The Dragoones are of the meanest Account, although many times they do the best Service.’

At Arlesford, during the Cheriton campaign in 1643, dragoons were used by both sides to ‘advance with as much speed’ to take the vacated town, ‘make good the Barocadoes’ and to stand together with the Horse to second them. The Royalists got there first. It would seem dragoon mounts were not paceless old nags, and that barricade-building as well as destruction (as at Torrington in 1646) was part of the dragoon’s repertoire. Ambuscadoes were another speciality of the dragoon, amply described by Burt and demonstrated at Farnham Castle Park in November 1643. Vanguard and rearguard action (first in, last out) were described by Lilburne at Marston Moor and Ennis and Abercromby at Islip Mill (March 1644/5,) and confirmed by Okey as having the ‘Forlorn guard every night’ in the Naseby campaign.

The securing of bridges, passages or the clearing thereof - again described by Burt in 1644 and demonstrated as if on cue by massed dragoons at Langport, and in a number of accounts including that of Lilburne in July 1645, lest we forget St Fagans, which was basically a dragoon offensive. And so it goes on: from ‘firelocks’ (unmounted dragoons) scaling castle walls in Cheshire to dragoons scouting for intelligence at Newport Pagnell. Although many authorities state that ‘their service is on foot, and is no other than that of a Musketeer’ (Sir James Turner, Pallas Armata), it would seem by all accounts that the service of a dragoon was anything but that of a musketeer, and after wading through heaps of documents, miles of microfilm and piles of books and tracts, I have yet to find an account that contradicts my statement that ‘dragoons were not just musketeers on horseback’.

Dragoons, have a care!

• BM Add Ms 63788
• BM Add Ms 34315 (Ordinance Office of Parliament)
• England’s Champions, Josiah Ricraft 1647
• BM Egerton Ms 2647
• A True Relation - possibly attributed to Elias Archer, B.M. 101 g.64
• Swedish Intelligencer 1, 103,iii 83
• Thomason Tracts on Langport, E292/28 & 30
• Parliamentary Chronicle, God’s Ark, by Vicars