Author: Alf Thompson, The Earl of Northampton's Regiment

Orders of the day, Volume 32, Issue 1, Jan/Feb 2000

On 24th September 1999 members of The Earl of Northampton’s Regiment paid a commemorative visit to Rowton Moor, near Chester. A wreath-laying ceremony at the battlefield memorial was followed by a battlefield walk and talk. Two troops of Northampton’s Cavalry fighting with Vaughan’s Brigade were either killed or captured at Rowton and the troop commander Major Flanock Colbourne was taken prisoner.

By the autumn of 1645 the King, as stubborn as ever and reluctant to admit defeat, was clutching at straws. On June 14th he had lost the decisive battle of Naseby and on 10th July had lost the battle of Langport. Between June and September 1645 Parliament had re-taken Leicester, captured Carlisle and taken Pontefract Castle. South Wales was rapidly falling under Parliamentary control and on 10th September Prince Rupert surrendered Bristol. Following the defeat at Naseby, the King, with remnants of his cavalry units, began a series of what appeared to be aimless wanderings, his only real hope was to join forces with the Marquis of Montrose, who had been marginalised by the King and his High Command, but who was now seen to be the saviour of the King’s cause. Whilst all England and South Wales was falling into the hands of Parliament, Montrose was still working his miraculous campaign of victories in Scotland. Against all odds he had achieved further victories at Auldearn in May, at Alford in July and at Kilsyth on 15th August. It begs questioning whether the King really knew of Montrose’s strength, which was always weak, or whether he believed Montrose to be invincible. Certainly Charles was looking for inspiration and an archetypal leader to fight his cause, especially since his lost faith in Rupert.

By 18th August the King had reached Doncaster on his mission to join Montrose, who was marching south to join him. Charles, believing that the Covenanting forces of Leslie were about to converge on him, retreated south once again, to set up his headquarters at Raglan Castle. In fact Leslie had no intention of engaging the King, but rather to confront Montrose who had all but taken Scotland. Leslie met Montrose at Philliphaugh on 13th September and annihilated him with a force of 6,000 against 600. The support that Montrose had always needed did not arrive and the miracle needed was one too many; his myth was washed away in the bloody butchery that followed Philliphaugh.

On 18th September the King, with his own Lifeguard and Vaughan’s Brigade (mostly cavalry remnants of The Oxford/ Southern Army), joined forces with Lord Langdale’s Northern and Lord Charles Gerard’s Brigades - a force of 3,500-4,000 cavalry. They rendezvoused at Atherstone Heath near Dorstone, near Hay-on-Wye. There was no infantry, though accounts of the battle of Rowton Moor suggest Royalist dragoon actions. On 20th or 21st September Charles marched north once again, perhaps once again attempting to join Montrose, not knowing the calamity that had befallen him on 13th September. By marching north along the Welsh Borders he might not only keep safe, but relieve Chester, one of the few Royalist strongholds still remaining and, perhaps more importantly, the only port in Royalist hands. Charles hoped that access to the Irish seaboard might bring further reinforcements from Ireland. A third reason for his departure was one of necessity as South Wales was falling to Parliament, and the armies of Parliament were closing in on him.

By 22nd September Charles had reached Chirk Castle and entered Chester the next day from the Welsh side of the city. Chester had been under constant siege since 1643, having sieges lifted at intervals by Lord Byron, Prince Maurice and Prince Rupert, however on 20th September, just as the King began his march, Brereton stormed the east side of the city and took the suburbs on the English side of the River Dee. The King was greeted with the news on his arrival at Chirk Castle and the Royalist plan was to divide forces and trap the besiegers. Charles entered Chester with his Lifeguard and Lord Gerard’s Brigade of about 600 cavalry, his aim to reinforce the garrison regiments of infantry commanded by Sir Francis Gamull and Roger Mostyn. Further garrison support was provided by Lord John Byron’s Regiment of Horse. Lord Byron had only recently reinforced the garrison with Mostyn’s Welsh recruits and was expecting further Welsh reinforcements from Hugh Wynne’s inexperienced regiment of foot.

The King spent the night in the house of Sir Francis Gamull whilst Langdale, in command of the main body of Horse, crossed the River Dee at Holt and by dawn on 24th September was approximately four miles from Chester at Millers Heath. Langdale commanded approximately 3,000 cavalry and his original intention was to trap and defeat the besieging Cheshire forces of Lt. Colonel Michael Jones and Major-General James Lothian, or drive them off into Cheshire towards Tarvin. Trapped between Langdale’s cavalry and the Chester garrison, the besiegers would have had little chance. However the relieving force had not bargained for the arrival of Colonel-General Sydenham Poyntz who, with his 3,000 cavalry made up of Northern and Midland Association troopers, had been tracking the King’s movements for some time. Charles and Langdale were aware of Poyntz shadowing their movements, but thought that he had been shaken off and was too far away to disrupt the Royalist plans. Unfortunately for the King, Poyntz was all too present, and as Langdale crossed the Dee so Poyntz marched out of Whitchurch to meet him.

Historical accounts of the actions of 24th September 1645 suggest that for all Langdale and Poyntz were aware of each other’s relative proximity, the mounted armies met quite unexpectedly on the morning of the battle. By 5.00am Langdale had drawn up his army on Millers Heath whilst Poyntz had advanced to Hatton Heath. The heaths lay approximately half a mile apart and straddled what is now the main Chester to Whitchurch Road. Poyntz was advancing along the road from Whitchurch which enabled Langdale, with more rested forces, to quickly take advantage of ground and line the hedgerows with his dragoons. However Langdale was in something of a dilemma, as the original intention was to trap the besiegers between his cavalry units and the garrison force. The tables had been turned, and it was he who was now trapped between the advancing Poyntz and the Parliamentarian besieging forces. Indeed the situation was now one of a tactical sandwich that held the ingredients of four separate forces almost in a straight line being formed between the Chester garrison and Poyntz’s position on Hatton Heath.

The Chester garrison had approximately 1,000 cavalry, made up of Gerard’s Brigade, Byron’s Horse and the King’s Lifeguard. Within the walls of Chester there must have been at least 500-800 foot made up of Gamull’s and Mostyn’s regiments and additional small units of foot gathered together by Byron to fend off the besieging forces. According to Parliamentary accounts, the besieging force consisted of 500 horse, 700 foot and 200 dragoons. Langdale had a force of between 2,500-3,000 horse and Poyntz 3,000 horse. At this stage of the conflict the odds would have been in favour of the Royalists. Indeed there is evidence to suggest that the Royalists had intercepted communications between the besieging Parliamentarians and the advancing force of Poyntz. This enabled the advantage to sway further to the Royalists, who could surprise the van of the marching column.

At approximately 7.00am on 24th September Langdale’s dragoons fired on Poyntz’s van as they moved along the Hatton Heath stretch of the road. Poyntz’s horse then attacked Langdale’s position on Millers Heath. The Parliamentarians were repulsed but not routed, though they had clearly lost the encounter. Poyntz lost approximately 20-30 dead and 60 Parliamentarian troopers were taken prisoner.

Having taken the first blood, the Royalists now threw away any advantage gained. A strange sequence of events then occurred in what was an extraordinary day in which the Royalists once again proved that they had a marvellous cavalier ability to grasp defeat from the jaws of victory. Langdale withdrew to his position on Millers Heath whilst Poyntz held his ground on Hatton Heath; both forces remained for about ten hours facing each other at a distance of about half a mile. At about 8.30am Langdale sent a message to the Chester garrison, but there is no evidence of its content. Morris (1924) describes how Lt. Col. Jeffrey Shakerley of Warden’s Regiment carried Langdale’s message. Shakerley, a local man, knew the most direct route to the city which avoided the besieging forces. He crossed the River Dee in a wooden tub (a large vessel used for the slaughtering of swine), rowing his make-shift boat across the deep and wide waters of the Dee, along with a servant. His horse swam alongside the tub and he managed to carry the message within 15 minutes. Barratt (1994) reminds us that we can only assume the contents of the message and suggests that Langdale either claimed he could hold and defeat Poyntz without assistance, or that he was urgently in need of the garrison’s support.

Langdale, though able to send good news of an early victorious encounter, was still in a very dubious position. He could certainly not attack the besiegers or attempt to enter Chester, as Poyntz would have fallen on his rear, and he seemed reluctant to attack Poyntz again without support. It is clear from the outcome of the day that something went tragically wrong with Royalist communications. Had Langdale suggested that he could beat Poyntz without support then surely he had committed a tactical error and was ultimately responsible for the Royalist defeat. If on the other hand he had requested support and it was not forthcoming, then the King and the indecision of the garrison commander were responsible for the defeat. For ten hours or so Langdale kept position, ‘waiting for something’. A number of questions require answers; as usual questions are easily placed, whilst answers remain the stuff of conjecture and informed guess work.

Why didn’t Langdale attack Poyntz again, especially since he had gained the upper hand? Was he awaiting reinforcements that never arrived? If he was waiting for support, then why did it not arrive? Barratt (1994) points to a number of possibilities that might account for Royalist indecision in the garrison. Byron and Langdale had a known dislike of each other, Gerard and Digby rarely agreed on anything, and the King had great difficulty in managing the conflicts between his commanders. There is also the view that the garrison were awaiting the arrival of Hugh Wynne’s Welsh Regiment who were due to arrive that day, and did eventually arrive at about 2.00pm. Another account suggests that when the garrison saw the withdrawal of some of the besiegers from the suburbs, they assumed they were running away and the battle all but won. In fact it was not a withdrawing force, but rather an attacking force mustering to support Poyntz.

Hall (1889) and Atkinson (1909), having compiled tracts of the events of 24th September 1645, each offer accounts of the tactical deliberations from a Parliamentary perspective. Reports of the dawn action gave an early indication that Poyntz had been utterly routed. At this point the besiegers were considering withdrawal, as they would have been clearly trapped between Langdale and the garrison. However whilst debating the best tactical option, further news came that Poyntz had held his ground and that his forces were intact. It is worth remembering that the distance of communication was only three miles and that Parliamentary forces were on the English side of Chester, with no need to cross the Dee. Their communications were effective and far more decisive than those between Langdale and the garrison. There must have been prearranged signals set up by the Parliamentarians throughout the morning and early afternoon. It is well documented that when the besiegers fired two cannon shots prior to their departure to join Poyntz, that Poyntz’s forces gave a great cheer. It was obvious that Poyntz and his men knew what they were waiting for, which is probably more than can be said of Langdale.

At about 2.00pm Lt. General Michael Jones led 350 horse out of the ranks of the besieging forces supported by Colonel John Booth with 500 musketeers. Their aim was to march along the Whitchurch-Chester Road to support Poyntz and outflank Langdale. A besieging force of 1,000 foot and 200 horse was left in the command of Major General Lothian. At about 4.00pm the Royalist garrison, observing the movements of Jones and Booth from the city walls, realised that this was not a withdrawing force, but rather an attacking force which placed Langdale in dire peril. The Royalists sent out 500 horse and 500 foot under Gerard’s command, however the Royalists could not venture out through the eastern suburbs in a direct route to attack the rear of Jones’s marching column because of the besieging force. Gerard had to manoeuvre his force around the suburbs, by which time Lothian had observed the Royalist intentions and intercepted Gerard’s force on Hoole Heath, on the fringe of the eastern suburbs. A confusing action took place between Gerard’s force and half the remaining besieging force commanded by Colonel Coote, and three divisions of Shropshire cavalry and an infantry force commanded by Captain Danielle. Both the Royalists and Parliamentarians claim victory for this episode in an eventful day, but the victory ultimately has to go to Parliament, as Gerard was prevented in his attempt to attack Jones’s from the rear. Indeed Gerard was stopped from joining Langdale, who had received orders to withdraw towards Chester because of the threat that now prevailed.

However it was too late for Langdale. He withdrew a mile or so closer to the City and took up position on open ground at Rowton Moor. Poyntz had now been joined by his reinforcements and advanced. As Langdale advanced for what appeared to be a typical cavalry clash, he must have quickly realised the error of his judgement. The musketeers of John Booth had taken up position in the hedgerows and lanes around the village of Rowton and on the flanks of Langdale’s advancing cavalry. As the cavalry clashed in the centre of the battle, so the Parliamentary foot poured in volleys of shot from the wings and devastated the van of Langdale’s advancing troopers.

The Royalist rear, which was essentially companies of Langdale’s Northern Horse, fled in all directions, ‘without giving execution’, some into Wales over Holt Bridge, whilst others galloped towards Chester. This was not the first occasion in which the rear and reserve of the Northern Horse had fled without giving battle, but Langdale’s van and the forward units gave a good account of themselves before fleeing the field.

Although the battle is often referred to as a cavalry battle, it was without doubt won by the fire-power of well-positioned Parliamentary musketeers, firstly on Rowton Moor with the decimating volleys of Booth’s Regiment, and then, as the Royalists ran back towards Chester, from the onslaught of Lothian’s musketeers.

“We hastened towards them in the best posture we could, the Horse was the battell, because many, the wings were foot, because few; they had the wind and the sun; we had God with us, which was our word, counterpoising all disadvantages, and countermanding all strength; a little before five o’clock we joined in a terrible storm, firing in the faces of one another, hacking and slashing with swords. Neither party gained or lost a foot of ground, as if everyone were resolved there to breath their last. Whilst the dispute was so hot and doubtful, our musquetiers so galled their horse, that their rear fled, perceiving their losse by them, upon whom they made no execution. Their van perceiving that, faced about and fled also.”

True Relation quoted in Atkinson (1909)

It was now early evening and Langdale was leading his routed cavalry back towards Chester for sanctuary, with Poyntz snapping at his rear, when he ran headlong into Lothian’s besieging forces. Gerard had managed to rally a counter-attack, but accounts suggest that Langdale’s routed cavalry crashed into Gerard’s position and caused complete mayhem. Poyntz drove Langdale and Gerard back onto the walls of Chester, and with the suburbs blocked by besiegers and only narrow lanes to negotiate, the Royalist position became a killing field for Lothian’s musketeers. A Royalist infantry sortie was sent out under the command of Astley and Glemham to offer a rearguard action, but they were driven back behind the city walls. It was during these final conflicts that the Earl of Litchfield was killed, and no less than eleven Royalists colonels taken prisoner. The King had suffered a crushing defeat in which he had lost at least 300 dead and over 1,500 wounded and taken prisoner. Although there are no records of Parliamentary dead it is reasonable to assume, based on the evidence available, that they too had lost between 250-300 dead during the day’s conflicts.

Some accounts suggest that the King himself made a sortie out of the city, others that he watched the whole of the day’s events from first the Phoenix tower and then the Cathedral tower. One account states that he was fired upon by a sniper positioned on the tower of St. John’s Church in the suburbs. Though the sniper missed his mark, he killed a captain who was in attendance on the King. Charles was now in a perilous position and that night fled the city into the relative safety of North Wales. Parliamentary records state that he was observed leaving with the remnants of his army which was calculated at about 600 horse. Before leaving, Charles requested that Byron hold Chester for at least ten days in order to buy time for his escape.

Byron, who had a chequered military career with indecision and lack of judgement hanging over him from his leadership exploits at Nantwich and then Marston Moor, now made amends for any previous errors. He managed to achieve what Rupert could not do at Bristol and held Chester until 3rd February 1646 against constant adversity, and on numerous occasions turned back Brereton’s Cheshire forces before finally surrendering. Brereton was not present at Rowton Moor, though he did instigate the siege of Chester and was quick to take credit for the actions of Poyntz, Jones, Lothian and Booth, who all went on to make illustrious careers throughout the Civil War years.

• History of The Siege of Chester During The Civil Wars in The Time of King Charles I (1790). Printed in Chester by Brosters & Son
• Tracts Relating to the Civil War in Cheshire 1641-1659 (1909). Ed. Rev. J A Atkinson
• Memorials of the Civil War in Cheshire and the Adjacent Counties, Thomas Malbon (1889). Ed. J Hall
• The Siege of Chester 1643-1646, Canon R H Morris (1924). Ed. P H Lawson
• The Civil Wars in Cheshire R N Dore (1966)
• The Siege of Chester and The Battle of Rowton Moor 1645, J Barratt (1994)