Author: Hugh Logan, Col. Lagthnan’s RO

Orders of the day, Volume 33, Issue 6, 2001/2002

Introduction

When James I of England had attempted to consolidate the Elizabethan conquest of Ulster by settling trustworthy English and Scottish settlers on land confiscated from the defeated and untrustworthy Irish (an event known as the ‘Plantation of Ulster’). He had turned Ulster into a powder keg that could explode at any time. The establishing of the anti-Catholic penal laws, debarring the Roman Catholic nobility from Irish politics, made the explosion a certainty. The spark that ignited the powder came in 1640 when the Scots took on the English Army in a bid to preserve their nation and religion, and won. The Irish, encouraged by the Scots’ example, began to plot.

Rebellion finally erupted on the night of 23rd October 1641. Native Irishmen attempted to capture Dublin Castle, the seat of English rule in Ireland. At the same time, armed bands of the Irish attacked the dwellings, settlements and strongholds of the English settlers (the Scots were left alone in the hope that they too would join the rebellion) at a large number of places throughout the counties of the Ulster Plantation. Although there was no general massacre, about 4,000 settlers perished as they fled from their farms to the safety of the towns.

From Ulster the rebellion spread to the other provinces of Ireland, where the native Irish were joined by the ‘Old English’ (the Roman Catholic descendants of medieval English settlers). In May 1642 the various groups of rebels came together to form the Irish Catholic Confederacy, with their own parliament which they set up in the town of Kilkenny, situated in the south-east corner of Ireland.

Background

Despite the initial successes achieved by the Irish rebels in Ulster in 1641, the government forces were able to hit back strongly, and by the summer of 1642 had gained the upper hand. Two armies made up of Scottish and English settlers, consisting of approximately 3,000 troops each and a Scottish army of 10,000 men under Robert Monroe had expelled the Ulster Confederates from about two thirds of Ulster while the main Ulster Irish army had wasted away in a futile attempt to capture Drogheda.

Towards the end of 1642 the failing Irish fortunes were given a shot in the arm with the arrival of Owain O’Neill, a Sergeant-Major General with the Spanish Army in Flanders with a distinguished record in the Thirty Years’ War. Hailed by the Ulstermen as their saviour, he immediately took command.

The ‘Crates’

O’Neill quickly set to work trying to form the Ulster Irish into some semblance of a conventional fighting force, using the 100 officers and 300 soldiers, (probably his own small Irish regiment) who had accompanied him from Flanders, as the core of a new army. He quickly discovered that this was more easily said that done. The problem was that most of the Ulster Irish lived in semi-nomadic communities or ‘crates’. Herds of cattle followed by men, women and children were driven from pasture to pasture, as the grazing in each area was exhausted. Bringing together enough crates into one area with sufficient pasture to allow an army to be trained was going to be a major headache. To do so within striking distance of the enemy was to prove impossible.

The Campaigns of 1643

The early summer of 1643 saw the British forces launch a number of offensives that persuaded O’Neill that he would have to temporarily abandon Ulster to his opponents. Robert Monroe’s Scots attacked O’Neill at his stronghold of Charlemont² in Co. Armagh, which they only just failed to capture, thanks to O’Neill’s skill in delaying the Scots’ advance by skilfully contesting a narrow ‘quickset lane’ surrounded by ditches and hedges. The Scots, finding that their supplies were exhausted, were forced to retire without making an attempt on Charlemont. At the same time the settler or planter³ forces, in west Ulster commanded by Sir Robert Stewart and in the east by Sir Arthur Chichester, launched devastating raids into the confederate-controlled heartland of the counties of Armagh, Tyrone, Cavan and Monaghan.

O’Neill Decides to Leave Ulster

By June 1643 O’Neill had made up his mind to quit Ulster altogether; the devastation caused by one and a half years of war had left the province incapable of provisioning an army. He was also aware that any attempt to concentrate his troops would lead to attack from the enemy before he had time to complete his army’s training. So on 9th June messengers were sent throughout Ulster ordering all the Irish chiefs with their followers to converge on the small town of Clones.

A contemporary noted how “all over Ulster, all the crates were on the march, men, women and children, so that nothing could be seen or heard but cows and running”. However not all obeyed. The Irish were still a divided people; Irish nationalism was a concept of the late 18th century and for most, loyalty to clan and clan chief was paramount. Powerful clans such as the O’Neills had many rivals, and the O’Reillys, also numerous and powerful, were one of the many who refused to obey. To make matters worse, some of the Fermanagh clans, tasked with watching the movements of Sir Robert Stewart’s “Laggan”³ Army, betrayed O’Neill and instead informed Stewart of O’Neill’s plans.

Map 1: Ulster, summer 1643. Following the initial Irish successes in 1641, the planter 3 and Scottish forces had consolidated their positions in Counties Antrim, Down, Londonderry, Donegal and Fermanagh. By the summer of 1643 their raids into the rest of Ulster plus a number of minor victories had forced O’Neil, with the exception of the fort at Charlemont, to abandon Ulster altogether.

The Opposing Forces

Contemporary sources differ on the number of forces available, however it appears that the Laggan Army had four under-strength foot regiments plus a few garrison troops, making approximately 2, 500 foot, with around 1,600 with O’Neill. The Laggan forces were reported as having three troops of horse to O’Neill’s two; perhaps 200 for the settlers as opposed to 150 Irish.

Moving rapidly from the Laggan through Enniskillen to pick up reinforcements, the Laggan forces converged on Clones undetected. Stewart had no intention of allowing the Ulster Irish the opportunity to return as a fully-trained and equipped modern army. He knew that the Irish, hampered as they were by their slow-moving herds, would have no choice but to stand and fight. There never would be a better opportunity to end the rebellion in Ulster once and for all. Outside Clones, Stewart halted his forces to rest and fortify themselves with ‘usquebagh’ (whiskey) before the coming battle. There the Irish finally discovered his presence.

O’Neill’s Dilemma

Panic-stricken Irish scouts swept into O’Neill’s encampment, bringing the incredible news that the Laggan Army was halted in a valley, just ‘one English mile’ away and were preparing to attack. It was decision time; the Irish could stand and fight or retire. O’Neill quickly called his officers together for a council of war and asked their advice. The experienced continental officers and O’Neill himself believed that a fighting withdrawal (the type of action that O’Neill had become so skilled in performing) was the correct plan of action. The Irish had been outmanoeuvred, and as a good proportion of their troops were still scattered throughout the various crates, it was plain to see that in any battle the Irish would be badly outnumbered.

However, O’Neill was still unsure of his position as commander of the Ulster Army. He relied for his support on the goodwill of local clan chiefs, and these inexperienced but enthusiastic warriors or ‘Bisanos’ demanded to be led against the enemy. In the words of one contemporary, O’Neill “did conform himself to Bisanos and brain sick people, strangers unto the consequence that might follow so rash a resolution”. Realising that to run and possibly suffer loss to the herds would be bad for his soldiers’ morale, O’Neill reluctantly drew up his forces for battle.

The Terrain

Set in the Drumlin belt of Ulster, the terrain around Clones consists of a mass of small wooded hills and streams, producing a great deal of boggy ground. Map 2 is a rough sketch of the terrain of the battlefield taken from contemporary accounts. Seeking out the best terrain possible, O’Neill posted most of his infantry, commanded by Shane O’Neill, at the head of a pass with their flanks protected by a hill on one side and a marsh on the other. In front of this pass was an area of open ground or ‘campaigne’, which then narrowed to a stone causeway or ‘cassy’ that carried the road across more marshland. At the entrance to the cassy were placed 100 musketeers. On the face of it the Irish were in a strong position; the Laggan forces would have to force their way over the cassy and through the pass if victory was to be theirs.

Map 2: Initial depositions. O’Neill leads the Irish cavalry (1) across the cassy to confront the Laggan forlorn hope (A). Is ambushed by the Laggan cavalry (B). The remainder of the Laggan infantry (C) forces the cassy, pushing back the Irish musketeers (2). Meanwhile Shane O’Neill’s Battalia holds the pass (3), while the remaining Irish infantry is rushed to his support (4).

The Battle Begins

Having drawn up those forces readily available, O’Neill, escorted by his cavalry, rode forward of his position across the cassy, in an attempt to scout the position of the enemy. Seeing a large infantry ‘forlorn hope’ moving towards him, O’Neill ordered his cavalry back across the cassy, but he was too late. From behind him the Laggan cavalry emerged from a concealed position, and began attacking his horse from the rear. The Laggan troops, “almost mad drunk with usquebagh” and screaming “Where’s McArt?⁴” assaulted the Irish in a furious charge. After a sharp engagement the Irish, finding themselves in an ambuscade, managed to cut their way through the Laggan horse and back to the safety of their own musketeers at the cassy.

The Turning Point

Stewart now used his strong ‘forlorn hope’ to force a passage across the cassy, something that the outnumbered Irish musketeers were powerless to prevent. Seeing his musketeers retreating across the open ground, with the enemy cavalry about to pursue, O’Neill, who had by now regrouped his horse, again led them forward.

Once again the cavalry clashed; the cry of “Where’s McArt?⁴” went up again as the settlers charged straight for the Irish general on their “light nags and armed with Scottish lances”. O’Neill found himself faced by a Captain Stewart who attacked him, sword in hand with a large knife between his teeth⁵. O’Neill fired his pistol and wounded Stewart, who, despite his wound, still pressed on with his attack. O’Neill was saved by one of his own officers who came to his assistance and was himself wounded, unhorsed and captured.

Meanwhile, Shane O’Neill, seeing that his own cavalry were hard pressed, made the fateful decision to move forward with his battalia of twelve companies onto the ‘campaigne’ to provide support. As long as Shane’s infantry had remained in the pass, their flanks had been protected and the Laggan Army’s superior numbers couldn’t be brought to bear. Now with Shane’s battalia out in the open, they were opposed by the whole of the Laggan forces that had by now crossed over the cassy. A contemporary wrote that “the service was hot for nearly half an hour”, then as the Irish foot were forced back, they “retired in great order, and were so hotly pursued that they broke in upon the second battalia of their own army and all the rebels, both horse and foot, ran for their lives”.

The Defeat

The Irish foot fled north, hotly pursued for eight miles by the Laggan horse. Some were cut down, but most found refuge amongst the wooded hills. O’Neill, his son and six companions escaped to Charlemont, shooting it out with the pursuing enemy cavalry on at least two occasions. The crates were scattered all over counties Armagh, Cavan and Monaghan and large amounts of cattle were captured by the Laggan army, along with most of the Ulster Army’s powder and weaponry.

The Cost

Casualties on both sides were remarkably light, considering the fierce fighting and the fact that there was a rout and pursuit. The Laggan Army was reported to have suffered six killed with a further twenty-three wounded, the Irish 150 killed or captured. These figures however don’t accurately reflect the scale of O’Neill’s defeat, as most of the casualties were caused to his European veterans, who stood and fought while the rank and file fled. An Irish account of the battle admits, “the Irish lost this day of gentlemen of quality and old commanders, hard upon seven score and odd men”. Another account stated that “the greatest part of the foreign officers which came over with O’Neill were killed or taken prisoner”.

O’Neill, in a letter to Sir Robert Stewart written after the battle, laid the blame for the defeat at the door of the hapless Shane O’Neill, stating that “had it not been by the disorder and confusion of the Lieutenant Colonel Shane Oge O’Neill, whom you have now in restraint, it had not gone of your side as it did”. The Irish officers taken prisoner seemed to have been treated well by the settlers, however one, Con O’Neill, who was granted quarter on the word of Sir Robert Stewart, was later shot in the back by a Presbyterian minister who had been acting as a chaplain to the Laggan forces. Incensed, Stewart threatened to have the minister shot. The man was only saved by the status his position afforded him; he was told to leave the army and never return.

The Aftermath

After three days spent at Charlemont, O’Neill, with a small force of stragglers, continued his journey to the safety of north Connaught. There others who had managed to evade capture joined him, along with a few of the scattered crates. Short of weapons, men and suppliers, O’Neill began to rebuild his shattered forces by recruiting from the northern counties of Connaught. All of his hard work was to bear fruit two years later when his Ulster and Connaught soldiers won victory after victory in Scotland and three years later on the battlefield of Benburb, where his army finally came of age.